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INTRODUCTION 
The faces of the United States district courts are fading. Judge 
Gerald Tjoflat reports that, during his tenure as chief judge of the 
Eleventh Circuit, several lions of the bar confided to him that they 
were unable to see the federal district judge before whom their cases 
were pending for as long as a year—even in complex litigation. These 
venerable trial lawyers stated that they were, at best, trundled off to a 
magistrate judge. Grants of summary judgment without any live 
appearance by counsel were commonplace, depriving trial attorneys 
of the opportunity to bring papers to life with oral argument. Instead, 
the papers were filed, and, some time later, a written order was 
issued. This is no lonely pixel. The phenomenon is fueled by the 
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centrality of the motion for summary judgment, which has displaced 
the trial as the destination point for litigation. Today it is unlikely that 
a trial date will ever be set, and rarer still that a trial date will have 
any meaning to the court and hence to the parties. Though in part 
anecdotal, these assertions gain a measure of validation based on the 
frequency of such complaints and the fact that, on average, a U.S. 
district judge tries fourteen cases, civil and criminal, per year, which 
last an average of between four and five days.1 Therefore, the average 
district judge has nearly three hundred days each year with no trials. I 
highlight these figures not to suggest that these judges are not 
working but rather to inquire as to what type of work they are 
doing—and what the answer means for rulemaking. 
My modest purpose in this brief Article is to lift up for 
examination certain weaknesses of the federal trial courts and to offer 
possible responses that could be implemented by the judges 
themselves, by the appellate courts, or by Congress. I recognize that 
isolating issues for separate examination risks failure to confront their 
collective impact, given that the present circumstance of the federal 
district courts is the product of a powerful synergism. I will attempt to 
mitigate this difficulty by presenting the full picture before turning to 
the pixels. 
I.  NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
A thesis that the federal trial courts are seriously flawed requires 
a baseline of operating normality. The first demand of regularity is 
that federal courts operate within their constitutional traces—Articles 
I and III. They must discharge their duty to decide all cases or 
 
 1. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola 
University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 
1405–06 (2002) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Ainsworth Lecture] (citing statistics from 2001). 
According to the latest figures from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, this 
number has remained unchanged. U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2009.pl (follow “Generate” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 5, 
2010) (noting that from 2007 to 2009, each judge completed twenty trials on average during each 
twelve-month period ending September 30). As I noted in the Ainsworth Lecture, the 
Administrative Office’s figures are not limited to trials in the conventional sense of bench or 
jury trials; they include any contested matter in which a judge takes evidence. Higginbotham, 
Ainsworth Lecture, supra, at 1406. This definition accounted for the difference, in 2001, in its 
reported average of twenty and my count of fourteen. Id. The Administrative Office’s count for 
2009 is also twenty, as it was in 2001, so it is reasonable to assume the actual number of trials in 
the conventional sense remains approximately fourteen. 
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controversies that fall within a legislative grant of jurisdiction,2 
including civil cases, federal criminal cases, collateral review of state 
criminal cases, and a wide genre of administrative decisions. These 
duties come with firm expectations arising from congressionally 
stated rules of process and expedition, as well as traditions and 
customs of the bench and bar. Remarkably—and troublingly—
adherence to these expectations, traditions, and customs 
progressively disintegrates as one lowers the level of generality and 
carves out specific issues for examination. 
In reality, trials are an increasingly small part of the daily routine 
of the federal trial courts. Most district courts now try very few civil 
or criminal cases—a documented phenomenon I will not rehearse 
here. One must keep this picture ever in mind because it is the most 
salient feature of the federal trial courts today—and as I see it, the 
manifestation of the illness I will discuss. Some do not see it this way, 
however,3 and before turning to causes, consequences, and remedies, 
I must note that federal trial judges are conflicted over whether the 
demise of trials is good or bad. Indeed, judges disagree over the 
dominating antecedent question of the normative standard itself—
whether a well-tried case is a failure of a trial court or its crowning 
achievement. A want of common understanding about what the work 
of a federal court ought to be when it is performing at its optimal 
level is fatal to rule changes aimed at that achievement. 
Against this general backdrop, I will argue that federal trial 
courts are now more like administrative agencies than trial courts in 
their present efforts to discharge their duty to decide cases or 
controversies, and that we are witnessing the death of an institution 
whose structure is as old as the Republic. I will describe these 
charges, discuss their validity, and then turn my focus to their 
consequences. Finally, I will discuss remedial responses. Throughout, 
the role of the trial judge as an agent of this change will be revealed. 
This discussion will be collegial, keeping in mind that collegiality is 
 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish. . . . The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . .”). 
 3. E.g., D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 
467–68 (2007) (arguing that for the modern litigant, trials are sources of unacceptable risk and 
expense). 
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much like Will Rogers’s definition of diplomacy: the fine art of saying 
“nice doggie, nice doggie,” while looking for a rock.4 
II.  THE PRESENT PICTURE 
On any given day, a walk through a typical federal courthouse is 
likely to find most of its courtrooms dark. That a courtroom is not to 
be closed except in the most limited circumstances is a 
constitutionally footed principle,5 and these dark courtrooms by 
definition defy the objective of openness in government. Of course, 
some few courts do not fit this description, but the exceptions validate 
rather than detract from this bleak picture of a bureaucratic-looking 
judiciary. The Eastern District of Texas was once a sleepy district 
relative to its urban neighbors of Dallas–Fort Worth and Houston. 
But there, Judge T. John Ward, a prominent defense lawyer when 
appointed, followed a “traditional” process of having firm trial dates 
and access to the district judges.6 The result was an influx of 
complicated litigation, as defendants and plaintiffs sought the benefits 
of these changes and filed in the Eastern District rather than in one of 
the major metropolitan areas with convenient air travel—a 
development that points a small arrow toward cause and effect. 
Over the past two decades, awareness of the decline of trials has 
crept slowly into the collective judicial consciousness. What most 
judges passed over as a temporary phenomenon brought on by 
dynamic dockets or by circumstances in a particular geographic 
region has now been recognized as an across-the-board change, albeit 
one that came on slowly at first. Empirical studies validate early 
alarums, and the bench and bar have puzzled over causes and 
remedies, and whether this decline is a good or a bad thing. The latter 
question—about the public good—cannot be separated from the issue 
of why trials are being displaced by paper filings. Nor can the want of 
trials be viewed as an insular, contained alteration that left the federal 
district courts otherwise the same. They are not. A clear picture of the 
 
 4. See JONATHON GREEN, THE CYNIC’S LEXICON: A DICTIONARY OF AMORAL ADVICE 
165 (1984) (quoting Will Rogers). 
 5. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564–575 (1980) (“From this 
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we 
are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal 
trial under our system of justice.”). 
 6. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, 
at B1 (“[T]he rules [adopted by Judge Ward] put patent lawsuits on a strict timetable, laying out 
when key documents must be handed over and setting firm trial dates.”). 
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fullness of the change is essential to reflect upon future pathways for 
federal rulemaking, as well as to identify rules in need of immediate 
discard or repair.7 
This move toward paper courts has increasingly shrunk the 
categories of persons appearing in open court—other than federal 
employees—to defendants being sentenced. District courts have 
become more remote and more detached from people. With the 
sentencing guidelines, fewer criminal cases are being tried.8 And the 
bar has lost its significant role in court-appointed cases, displaced by 
federal public defenders. This leaves the criminal side of the docket to 
federal employees and a narrow range of private counsel who appear 
for the few defendants who can pay. In the occasional civil jury trial, 
there will be only six to eight jurors—a reduction from twelve-
member juries enacted despite virtually all serious studies finding that 
changes in jury size alter the dynamics of deliberation in undesirable 
ways.9 
 
 7. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy—The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 
31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 271 (1980) (arguing that “[w]e must respond to the pressure to 
accommodate the increasing number of disputes flowing from a burgeoning federal 
government” while remaining “wary of proposals that tamper with the basic structure of the 
federal courts that has served us so well”); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts 
on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
637, 649 (2009) (“The plain fact is that this system has promoted private litigation. In brief, the 
1938 Rules took much of the case away from the courthouse and brought it to the conference 
rooms of law firms.”); Higginbotham, Ainsworth Lecture, supra note 1, at 1407 (“Lacking a 
provable etiology, the changes are most easily described as a syndrome with two conspicuous 
symptoms: the decline in trials, and the nigh parallel surge in private dispute resolution. These 
symptoms are further defined by the attending decline in participation of lay citizens and the 
state in our justice system.”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Mahon Lecture, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 501, 505 (2006) (“When we widen our lenses, we find disturbing trends, such as the decline 
of trials with federal trial courts looking like European courts. We also find a suspiciously 
parallel flow of dispute resolution to the administrative agencies.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004) (observing the prevalence of guilty pleas under the federal 
sentencing guidelines). 
 9. The Advisory and Standing Committees of the Rules Committee in 1996 recommended 
a return to the twelve-person jury in civil trials, which was ultimately rejected by the Judicial 
Conference in a close vote. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., MEETING OF OCTOBER 20–21, 1994, DRAFT MINUTES 17–19, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV10-1994.pdf (“Many scholars 
agree that 12-member juries are better. The vast weight of history and tradition creates a strong 
presumption in favor of 12. A 12-person jury, moreover, makes it much more probable that any 
single jury will include representatives of significant minority groups. The importance of 
representativeness has been underscored by recent decisions that limit the use of peremptory 
challenges for the purpose of striking minority members from a jury; it is ironic that one of the 
surest safeguards of representativeness should be sacrificed in the name of expediency. Smaller 
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Finally, it is telling that the decline in cases tried has not 
shortened the time from trial to disposition. Rather, the time has 
lengthened, and demands for discovery have increased. Increases in 
discovery costs have contributed to the rising costs of litigation,10 
leading many commentators to tender the increasing costs of 
discovery as an explanation for the declining trial. But accepting that 
discovery is the single most powerful explanatory variable in 
explaining the rising costs of civil litigation and that these costs have 
paralleled the decline in trials, one must test the hypothesis that the 
increase is responding to the decline in trials. One might invert the 
hypothesis and contend that the decline in trials is responsible for the 
increased demands of discovery. Consider the loss of the vital sense of 
relevance and discipline when preparing a case in the shadow of a 
meaningful trial date. Add in a generation of litigators who have no 
trial experience and are ill equipped to sort through relevant 
information in discovery. Young attorneys without trial experience 
may insist on excessive discovery out of fear of missing something, 
because they cannot know what will be useful at trial, and in 
accordance with their economic incentives to check behind every 
button when the prudence of their actions will never be tested by a 
trial.11 
Rulemaking has failed to slow this economic fountain. Unable to 
control discovery, the regulatory response has been to attempt to 
 
jury verdicts, moreover, are more erratic, less stable, for a variety of reasons. In many ways, the 
capacities and behavior of a group of 6 are different from those of a group of 12. It is more 
difficult for a single aggressive juror to dominate a larger group. Larger juries bring broader 
ranges of experience and values to the deliberation, and are better able to recall trial 
evidence.”). 
 10. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM app. A (2008), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3650 (observing that “[o]ver 
87% of [surveyed American College of Trial Lawyers] Fellows indicated that e-discovery 
increases the costs of litigation” and that “[o]ver 75% of Fellows agreed that discovery costs, as 
a share of total litigation costs, have increased disproportionately due to the advent of e-
discovery”). 
 11. Higginbotham, Ainsworth Lecture, supra note 1, at 1417 (“The reality is that lawyers 
too often lack incentive to curb pretrial preparation. There is the reality of time billing and the 
advocate’s tendency to over-prepare for a trial that increasingly he has little experience to 
conduct. The truth is that parties, and judges, expect that the case will settle—an expectation 
largely being fulfilled by the new class of lawyers, called litigators, few with substantial trial 
experience. As trials disappear, discovery is only a path to settlement. ‘ADR’ becomes a choice 
between the expensive arm wrestling of discovery or more direct paths to agreement.”). 
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limit access to it—witness the rise of particularized pleading.12 
Heightened pleading standards are less measured, less targeted, and 
less predictable than rule processes, but they at least swipe at the 
problem of rising discovery costs. This response is welcome only for 
its implicit recognition that there is a problem. Efforts to construct 
gates for access to discovery must address the marriage of notice 
pleading and discovery that was fundamental to the 1938 Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, confronting both the difficulties it has 
wrought and its instrumental role in enforcing legislative and 
constitutional norms. Insisting that a plaintiff plead more specifically 
before accessing discovery does not adequately confront these 
challenges. Commendably, it does move toward greater judicial 
control of access to the full engine of discovery, or perhaps toward 
prescribing a smaller engine for smaller jobs. For now, however, 
particularized pleading has created a perverse regime directed at 
cases in which there is likely to be an imbalance among parties in 
access to needed evidence. It is a mistake to approach discovery costs 
as unnecessary excess that parties could limit or avoid by mutual 
agreement, or as solely a product of perverse economic incentives for 
hourly paid counsel or extortionate tactics of strike-suit lawyers. 
Though such abuses do exist,13 particularized pleading is a poorly 
tailored response.14 Broad access to discovery is often a necessity in 
 
 12. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 61–62 (2010) (“Twombly justified establishing 
plausibility pleading on the basis of assumptions about excessive discovery costs for [large 
corporate and government defendants] and the threat of extortionate settlements.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized 
Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 173 (1985) (“The second policy 
motivating Rule 9(b) is the prevention of strike suits.”); Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Reevaluating the Pleading Requirements for Market 
Manipulation Claims, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 763, 763–64 (2005) (“In 1995, Congress enacted the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995[, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scatted sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.),] . . . to address the serious flaws in the private 
securities litigation system. Courts, Congress, and many commentators agreed that the chief evil 
plaguing the system was strike suits, suits ‘based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance 
value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.’ Strike suits prevailed in private 
securities claims because, irrespective of the merits of the claim, it was usually less costly for 
defendants to settle than fight the allegations.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 679 (2d pocket ed. 2001))). 
 14. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595–96 (1998) (noting that the “indirect effort 
to regulate discovery” through heightened pleading standards “employs a blunt instrument that 
carries a high cost, for it[] . . . also imposes a heightened standard . . . upon plaintiffs with bona 
fide constitutional claims”); id. at 597–601 (suggesting a variety of ways that a district court may 
limit pretrial costs without invoking heightened pleading requirements); Christopher M. 
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554 (2002) (“[T]he resurgence and 
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suits by private attorneys general, especially in a country so 
dependent on private suits to enforce federal normative standards. 
Recent events have laid bare the consequences of underenforcement 
of federal regulatory schemes. It seems odd to now impede the 
efficacy of this vital method of enforcement. Rather, controls on 
access to discovery—particularly controls that are inconsistent with 
the underpinnings of the 1938 Rules—must be carefully balanced to 
preserve the enforcement role of private attorneys general. That is, a 
gate restricting access to discovery must be able to screen by merit. 
Perhaps a more appropriate system might be to allow an initial 
opportunity for limited discovery, followed by an examination into 
the likely merit of the suit before granting access to greater discovery. 
Regardless, once one moves from trial to paper courts, limits on 
access become the only effective cost-control tool. 
III.  CAUSATION PATTERNS 
A. The Rise of Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
As trials have declined, private arbitrations have grown 
exponentially. At the same time, alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) has gained a life of its own. The relationship among these 
three phenomena is complex.15 It is tempting to describe their 
relationship in causal terms: that ADR, with its emphasis upon 
consent-based dispute resolution, accounts for the reduction in the 
number of trials; that litigants’ efforts to escape the adversarial 
processes of trial systems either fueled arbitration or fed on perceived 
costs of trial such as indeterminacy and loss of control over risks and 
costs; and that the distribution among district courts, ADR, and 
arbitration reflects the preferences of litigants. For now I will treat 
ADR and arbitration as competing with the public model for the 
business of dispute resolution, even if they do not fully share common 
 
resilience of heightened pleading jeopardizes a procedural balance carefully forged by the 
drafters and embodied in the Federal Rules.”). 
 15. See DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, CORNELL/PERC INST. ON CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE 
GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 5 (1998), available at http://digitalcommons.
ilr.cornell.edu/icrpubs/4/ (“One of the foremost trends in corporate America in the 1990s has 
been the shift from traditional litigation and government agency resolution of disputes toward 
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the 
“Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 843, 843 (2004) (examining “the relationship between ADR and court trial”). 
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objectives. Arbitration, after all, does rely on a neutral arbiter to 
impose a resolution; it does not wholly abandon the adversarial 
process. Rather, it hopes to reduce indeterminacy by moving to a 
resolution system that offers the opportunity to choose arbiters with 
specialized knowledge and to reduce costs by limiting discovery. 
There is evidence that corporate defendants exercise some 
influence over arbiters’ decisionmaking through the prospect of 
future engagements following favorable outcomes.16 However 
widespread such abuse is, the preference of corporations for private 
arbitration represents an effort to regain executive control over 
litigation—control that would ordinarily be relinquished at the 
courthouse door. The promise of keeping disputes private and 
outcomes confidential also motivates a large part of corporate 
America’s move from the courthouse.17 In short, corporations are 
choosing arbitration to remain close to the adversarial model but to 
eliminate some of its unwanted costs. 
ADR has prospered for similar reasons, but it is nonetheless 
different in critical respects. ADR is often seen as the creature of 
business, although much of its rationale originated in the academy 
and, ironically, has been repurposed to serve business’s self-interest. 
Economic costs like indeterminacy are driving forces, but at its heart, 
ADR is a rejection of the adversarial system’s emphasis on judicial 
disinterest and attorney-championed contests. The turn here is to 
“relationships” and subscription to a philosophy that disputants 
themselves should resolve their disputes, with the process serving 
both instrumental and intrinsic goals. This concept is not new; Dr. 
Laura Nader has described various tribal systems that rest on similar 
impulses.18 What is new is that courthouse players have become more 
 
 16. And arbitration does not always offer a neutral arbiter. Some elect arbitration to 
capture a bias. See generally Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who 
Wins), BUSINESSWEEK, June 16, 2008, at 72 (describing the National Arbitration Forum as a 
for-profit arbitration company catering to, and often advantaging, large companies). 
 17. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (“People who 
want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the courts, they must accept the 
openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) 
officials. Judicial proceedings are public rather than private property . . . .”); supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. See Laura Nader, Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY 69 (Laura Nader ed., 1969) (describing the Zapotec strategy for settling disputes 
outside the court system). For further discussion of tribal systems in which an “adjudicator, 
judge, [or] arbitrator[] is absent,” see P.H. Gulliver, Dispute Settlement Without Courts: The 
Ndendeuli of Southern Tanzania, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 24, 25. 
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receptive as the reality of ADR’s distinct economic opportunities for 
bench and bar became apparent. Judges not wanting to try cases, for 
whatever reason, were receptive—perhaps seeing ADR as a way to 
provoke settlements and reduce their caseload—thus maintaining a 
rate of disposition that would approximate that of an active trial 
court19 without the distraction of that enterprise. Whatever the 
impetus for ADR, the state and federal judiciary began to order 
mediation,20 creating a large business for lawyers and former judges.21 
The forces driving the growth in arbitration overlap in part with 
those underlying growth in ADR, but ADR has distinct origins and is 
impelled by different concerns. Both systems enjoy judicial support, 
much of it enthusiastic if not representative. Though American courts 
were often hostile to arbitration in the years before the enactment of 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),22 the Supreme Court has since 
warmed to private resolution of disputes that are free of large social 
issues, and it now embraces arbitration. This changing mindset 
paralleled the Court’s success in gaining discretion to decide what 
 
 19. I say “approximate” because, as I read the historical research, and in my experience, 
roughly nine of ten civil cases will settle when a trial will occur absent settlement. See, e.g., 
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (“Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that 
are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most 
are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury 
or a judge.”). 
 20. See Doug Marfice, The Mischief of Court-Ordered Mediation, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 57, 62 
(2002) (“‘Court-annexed mediation’ is that which has specifically been ordered by a court 
absent any solicitation by the parties for such an order. In all jurisdictions, litigants are free to 
conduct mediation of their own volition. It is almost uniformly encouraged. However, in some 
jurisdictions, judges and/or elected lawmakers have taken it upon themselves to do more than 
just suggest mediation as an alternative and have adopted procedures for court-annexed 
mediation.”). 
 21. Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 81, 81 (“Whereas once citizens were called upon to volunteer as mediators in 
community justice centers outside the courts, now mediation is a line of business for lawyers 
whose customers are sent to them by the courts.”). 
 22. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. 
Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Prior to the passage of the 
FAA, American courts were generally hostile to arbitration. They refused, with rare exceptions, 
to order specific enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925. As the Court has 
explained, the FAA was a response to hostility of American courts to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, a judicial disposition inherited from then-longstanding English 
practice.”); Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1425–32 (2008) (describing the 
metamorphosis of the FAA from a statute with restrained reach into the “broadly sweeping, 
muscular statute we know today”). 
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cases it will decide, an effort that began in 1925 with a full-court press 
and has continued to present. The basic concept undergirding 
arbitration is that, with narrow exceptions, persons should be free to 
contract with one another regarding the handling of any dispute that 
may arise during the performance of their agreements. This basic 
proposition cannot be gainsaid. But the FAA does not operate 
entirely in the private world. Rather, it drafts the federal courts to 
enforce these private decisions to arbitrate while at the same time 
allowing parties to escape the courts’ review of whether the contract 
has been materially breached.23 The point here, lightly made but 
salient, is that arbitration and ADR are relevant to this examination 
of the vanishing trial not so much for their abstract value but for their 
insights upon the strengths and weaknesses of the federal trial courts 
and as significant parts of the milieu in which we ponder the courts’ 
difficulties and private dispute resolution’s ease. 
B. The Decline in Attorneys with Trial Experience 
The decline in trials has another defining characteristic: it has 
created over time a judiciary and a bar with a new shared culture, 
which takes as a given that civil cases are to be settled if summary 
judgment is not granted. With fewer trials there are fewer lawyers 
with trial experience and, consequently, fewer judges taking the 
bench with trial experience. When Clyde LaPorte and Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell set the experience required for 
appointment to the federal district court, their letter of agreement 
insisted that the American Bar Association (ABA) should not find a 
person who lacked “substantial trial experience” to be qualified to 
preside over a trial court, and that trial experience was also important 
for a prospective nominee to the court of appeals.24 This 
 
 23. The Supreme Court has already reined in the scope of private contracting by finding 
party agreements regarding the scope of review by federal courts impermissible under the FAA. 
See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1276 (2009) (“The text of § 4 [of the FAA] 
instructs federal courts to determine whether they would have jurisdiction over ‘a suit arising 
out of the controversy between the parties’; it does not give § 4 petitioners license to 
recharacterize an existing controversy, or manufacture a new controversy, in an effort to obtain 
a federal court’s aid in compelling arbitration.”); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987 (2008) 
(holding that where there is an agreement to arbitrate, the FAA supersedes any state law 
lodging primary jurisdiction in other forums, either administrative or judicial). 
 24. See Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lord, Day & Lord (Sept. 30, 1965), in 
HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 185 (1993) (“As guidelines for such selection[, Herbert 
Brownell and I] established, between us, certain criteria for the appointment of all Federal 
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understanding could not practically be enforced today, given that only 
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers regularly try cases. 
Even on the criminal side, where pleas are under the shadow of 
trial, more than 80 percent of cases historically resulted in plea 
agreements, and this rate increased to almost 90 percent under 
mandatory sentencing guidelines. The guidelines appear to have 
pushed the decline in criminal trials, given that criminal adjudication 
has largely escaped the forces of ADR, discovery costs, the loss of 
twelve-person juries, and mediation as a business. How the return to 
a measure of trial court discretion in sentencing will impact the trial 
rate is still uncertain. 
Criminal cases are correctly seen as “public” as distinguished 
from “private” litigation, although this generalization understates the 
vital public interest in private litigation. The want of trials feeds 
indeterminacy of civil laws. Without a steady stream of trials—so that 
settlements, when they occur, only do so in the shadow of trials—the 
public loses sight of the law clearly and consistently applied. The 
decline in trials also reduces the stream of citizens into the 
courthouses for jury service. These changes have come to pass even 
though, from 1787 forward, the expectation was that the state would 
furnish the courthouses and the staff to offer public dispute 
resolution. 
In short, the public interest is frustrated by dark courtrooms and 
by an unquestioning subscription to an unqualified right of persons to 
contract out from the courthouse, especially given the potential for 
private dispute resolution to soften rules of law into mere guidelines 
for relationships. This undervaluing of both the public role of civil 
litigation and the need for visible adjudication to bring life to the law 
underlies our willingness to accept six-person juries for civil cases 
while clinging to twelve-person juries for felony prosecutions. Indeed, 
it underlies much of the judicial and congressional acquiescence in the 
promotion of ADR. 
 
Judges. . . . No prospective appointee would be selected until his qualifications had been 
reported as satisfactory by both local and national echelons of the American Bar 
Association. . . . Later we added another: except in unusual circumstances no one would be 
appointed to the Supreme or Appellate Courts unless he had experience in a lower Federal 
court or in a State Supreme Court.”). 
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C. The Loss of the Twelve-Person Jury 
The courts’ willingness to accept six-person juries is in tension 
with the well-established view that there are questions which, though 
too important and too complex to be left to the discretion of a 
random jury of fellow citizens, can be well-handled by a single judge. 
That is, the courts have accepted six-person civil juries even though at 
other times they apparently maintain that juries are too 
unpredictable. 
The flow from the courthouse rests in part on this notion of 
unpredictability and has been hastened by the high Court’s 
dismantling of the twelve-member jury in civil cases and the legal 
establishment’s continuing acquiescence in this change. A return to 
twelve-person civil juries—with 10-to-2 verdicts—would help to 
restore two values of which the district courts have lost sight: first, it 
would lessen the specter of uncertainty often associated with juries; 
and second, it would validate the public-as-arbiter model. Further, it 
would stand on the correct side of empirical data demonstrating that 
twelve jurors are indeed better than six, and better in ways that over 
time might tilt a private attorney general’s or corporation’s cost-
benefit calculus in favor of going to trial.25 Jury studies now widely 
agree that six-person juries are more likely to render less-predictable 
and less-reliable decisions and are less representative of society than 
are traditionally sized juries. 
The effort of the Judicial Conference Rules Committee in the 
mid-1990s to require an initial empaneling of twelve jurors in civil 
trials was based on salient data showing that a jury of twelve is greatly 
preferable over a jury of six. For instance, it is wrong to assume that 
an increasingly diverse and heterogeneous population can be truly 
represented by a six-person jury. Numerous studies show a significant 
increase in minority presence on twelve-person juries as compared 
with six-person juries.26 A jury of twelve is likely to produce more-
 
 25. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230–39 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating the 
empirically demonstrated differences between six- and twelve-person juries); Robert H. Miller, 
Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of 
State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 682–83 (1998) (summarizing the social science 
research and explaining that “six- and twelve-person juries are not functionally equivalent”). 
 26. See, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering “Nondiscernible” Differences: Empirical 
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 668–69, tbl.1 (1975) (“[T]he presence 
of jurors with viewpoints, abilities, quirks, or racial identities that characterize only a minority of 
the population is more likely with larger juries.”). See generally Richard S. Arnold, Trial by 
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reliable decisions than its six-person counterpart, for with greater 
diversity comes a greater number and greater breadth of viewpoints.27 
Similarly, studies show that, during the course of trial, jurors are 
exposed to different interpretations and understandings of the 
evidence and tend to correct each other’s errors.28 With six jurors, that 
corrective mechanism is diminished; it follows that the likelihood of 
uncorrected error will increase if there are six persons deliberating, 
rather than twelve. Research also suggests that the group deliberation 
process benefits from pooled memories of the evidence presented at 
trial.29 Having a greater number of members allows the jury as a 
whole to better recall the evidence, whereas having fewer jurors 
might result in more gaps in the collective knowledge base. Jury 
outcomes and the quality of deliberation are likewise sensitive to jury 
size: in a smaller jury, there is greater likelihood that a majority will 
exert pressure against a juror who disagrees with the rest of the panel, 
whereas in larger juries, a minority member is more likely to find an 
ally of similar mind.30 These disadvantages are all the more troubling 
because the system of smaller civil juries also arose as responsibility 
for enforcement of much of the public law was entrusted to private 
actors—a characteristic now considered critical to the modern 
regulatory state. In 1990, a special task force appointed by the ABA’s 
Section of Tort and Insurance Practice filed, and the House of 
Delegates adopted, a report charting the large impact of the reduced 
representativeness of civil juries and adopting the official position 
 
Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 29–32 
(1993) (collecting and discussing such studies). 
 27. See Arnold, supra note 26, at 31 (discussing studies showing that the quality of juror 
discussion and deliberation is better in larger groups than smaller groups, partly due to the 
greater number of viewpoints). 
 28. See, e.g., REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 
88 (1983) (discussing the rates of error correction in a study of jury deliberation); Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217 
(Autumn 1989) (noting that in a study of mock jury deliberations, “errors of fact generally were 
corrected”). 
 29. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233 (1987) (“As juries decrease in size, then, they are less likely 
to have members who remember each of the important pieces of evidence or argument.”). 
 30. See Hans Zeisel, And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 
U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 720 (1971) (noting that hung juries are more common in twelve-member 
juries because a person holding the minority view is more likely to have an ally). 
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that federal trial courts should reinstate twelve-person civil juries.31 
This simple math can be ignored, but it cannot be refuted. 
D. The Drift of Federal Courts to the Civil Law Model and Their 
Capture by the Administrative Model 
If federal trial courts are so changed that they no longer look like 
trial courts, it is instructive to ask what they do resemble. Doing so 
may reveal patterns of causation—what brings us here and what 
“here” is. Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton describe 
the current state of federal trial courts thus: 
The Article III judge was thus moved off the trial bench for most of 
his or her service, and into an executive office to give directions to 
subordinates. In lieu of trials, the district judges and their staffs tend 
to practice “managerial judging,” a process by which they seek, by 
diverse methods, to facilitate settlements and avoid the necessity of 
making decisions that might burden a court of appeals with the need 
to review their judgments. Or, if a decision on the merits must be 
made, to render it in the form of a summary judgment, ruling one 
party’s proposed evidence to be legally insufficient and hence 
unworthy of being heard, a procedure that spares the trial judge the 
need to see and hear witnesses, but still enables him or her to 
expound the controlling law.32 
As the districts moved to judicial management of cases, 
retreating from party-managed cases, Congress was persuaded to give 
assistance to district judges in the form of subordinate magistrate 
judges. At first, these preliminary arbiters were known simply as 
magistrates, but Congress soon changed their title to judge, and these 
new judges in turn enlisted law clerks to assist them in their assisting 
role. This change paralleled the path of hearing examiners, who later 
became administrative law judges. District courts were quick to 
delegate work to magistrate judges, including large volumes of 
prisoner petitions—both § 1983 suits and § 2254 habeas petitions—
and social security cases. These cases moved from the pens of district-
judge law clerks to those of magistrate judges. 
 
 31. ABA, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 12–13, 1990) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (supporting legislative efforts to restore the size of the federal civil jury 
to twelve persons). 
 32. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 627–28 (2009). 
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The same cadre was simultaneously lobbying Congress to bring 
the army of administrative law judges into the circle of Article III, 
granting them independence from the agencies they served. Senator 
Howell Heflin, former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, 
gave serious consideration to this urging. Administrative law judges 
decide more “cases” than Article III judges, even with the assistance 
of magistrate judges,33 but the administrative model makes extensive 
use of paper submission. Though administrative law judges were, in 
their early development, markedly different from Article III trial 
judges, over time administrative judges moved toward the Article III 
model as they changed titles and gained staff. At the same time, 
federal district courts began to look more like agency adjudicators—a 
remarkable confluence. 
As the district courts outsourced their work to magistrates and 
administrative law judges, appellate courts in turn delegated their 
work to large offices of staff counsel. The Fifth Circuit, for example, 
employs approximately sixty staff attorneys. Appeals courts have 
adopted this method of deciding largely pro se cases for practical 
reasons that go beyond the concerns relevant here. It is significant, 
however, that the federal courts have grown accustomed to this paper 
process and to delegation of judicial duty. Appellate courts are just as 
vulnerable to the temptation of excessive delegation of judicial work 
as are trial courts. For example, federal court of appeals judges now 
have four law clerks in chambers. Far too many of these judges write 
no opinions, instead putting their names on the work of bright young 
lawyers. The sorry scene of appellate judges competing for the 
brightest clerks is telling. Law schools and some judges have tried to 
rein in this annual embarrassment by establishing times for 
application, interviews, and job offers—only to see the rules ignored 
or gamed by judges. This state of affairs raises serious questions of 
judicial competence at both the trial and appellate levels. It plainly 
suggests that many judicial seats are being held by persons unable or 
unwilling to do the work themselves. 
The relevant point here is that the bulk of the work of federal 
district judges was for many years virtually nondelegable. Only the 
judge was on the bench, and the bar quickly became aware of the 
judge’s abilities. Federal trial judges selected today, however, often 
 
 33. Higginbotham, Mahon Lecture, supra note 7, at 506 (noting that Department of Health 
and Human Services administrative law judges adjudicate more civil cases each year—320,000—
than all federal district courts combined). 
HIGGINBOTHAM IN FINAL.DOC 11/29/2010  7:02:06 PM 
2010] THE PLIGHT OF THE DISTRICT COURTS 761 
lack relevant trial experience, thereby reinforcing the need for 
delegation, while the absence of trials permits this delegation and 
seeds the move toward the administrative model. 
IV.  A RETURN TO ROLES 
Having discussed the ways federal trial courts have strayed from 
their proper path, I now confront the question of what federal trial 
courts should be. One must begin with the constitutional demand of 
independence, a status the Framers sought to protect by providing for 
life tenure upon good behavior and for salary protection. 
Unfortunately, the latter has not been realized in light of steady 
erosion through inflation. This rapid decline in the value of judicial 
salaries narrows the pool of highly qualified nominees and has 
provoked an unprecedented flight from the judiciary. Although 
beyond the reach of the rules process, I mention this reality because it 
inevitably bears on any effort to restore the vitality of federal trial 
courts. 
The proposition that trial courts should try cases seems a given, 
yet the reality is that federal district courts have moved so far from 
this task that it is an open question. At the outset I observed that 
many judges do not agree that conducting trials ought to be their 
primary function. Judges who subscribe to this philosophy hold trials 
only when they cannot persuade the parties to settle their case 
through mediation or through protracted delays before scheduling a 
trial. Such attempts at stalling as a means to provoke settlement 
provide one compelling explanation for the increase in time to trial 
even as trials have decreased in number. But a return to a model in 
which the principal work of the trial judge is to try civil and criminal 
cases need not take away from opportunities for litigants to privately 
elect methods to settle their disputes. Historically, setting a firm trial 
date and providing pretrial access to the presiding judge has produced 
a 90 percent settlement rate with a shorter time from trial to 
disposition.34 My concern is not that trial courts must be more 
competitive with ADR or arbitration. Rather, it is to support and 
maintain the important role of the federal trial courts, offering 
litigants a forum that is fair, independent from public opinion, 
evenhanded, and affordable. As I have observed, the flight from the 
courthouse appears to have been fueled in the main by the high costs 
 
 34. See supra note 19. 
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of discovery, the indeterminacy of the trial process, and corporate 
litigants’ seeming preference for exercising private control over their 
disputes. In the case of jury trials, indeterminacy has been 
heightened—beyond that level inherent in any third-party 
adjudication—by reducing jury size and the increasingly broad and 
open-ended questions we put to juries, such as whether a product is 
“defective.” On the latter point, indeterminacy of an abstract legal 
rule—take, for example, Section 402 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts35—becomes determinate only in the context of a fact pattern at 
trial. Without trials we lose this important ingredient of judicial 
enforcement of legislative norms. 
CONCLUSION 
The present state of affairs makes plain that the federal district 
courts are not on the correct path. Returning to a trial model would 
be a significant step toward fulfilling the traditional expectations for 
the federal courts. Much of the present difficulty arose from 
seductive—but ultimately misguided—notions that there is a better 
way. 
The United States district courts are the most vital judicial 
institution in this country. Their courageous history of protecting the 
constitutional rights of the disfavored and the downtrodden has 
earned their great prestige and solidified their venerable role in 
American governance. Federal trial courts cannot maintain this status 
if they become indistinguishable from state highway departments; but 
on the present trajectory, this is their destination. If this bleak picture 
comes to pass, life tenure cannot be defended, and Article III “trial” 
courts will become indistinguishable from the thousands of 
administrative law judges. Civil service is just over the horizon. 
The first step toward remedying this problem is to realize what it 
means for the district courts to operate at their optimal level. I have 
described the federal district courts as they now exist, and though this 
general description cannot capture every local variation, its broad 
accuracy is supported by available data. There are three possible 
responses to this troubling picture. First, one might conclude that the 
 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965) (“A seller of a chattel manufactured 
by a third person, who neither knows nor has reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, 
dangerous, is not liable in an action for negligence for harm caused by the dangerous character 
or condition of the chattel because of his failure to discover the danger by an inspection or test 
of the chattel before selling it.”). 
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picture is inaccurate and that federal district courts are in fact 
operating in their intended way. Second, one might determine that 
the picture is a fair approximation but that it should be left alone. 
Those with this reaction would accept the change in the role of the 
district courts and view it as an optimal—or at least more desirable—
model for the federal courts. Finally, one might conclude that the 
principal work of a district court is to try cases and to offer litigants 
the opportunity for a reasonably prompt and impartial trial. 
As one who firmly believes the district courts have lost their way, 
I have sought here to chart a course by which Congress or the 
judiciary could restore district courts to their proper role as trial 
courts. First, they should make federal trials more attractive to 
litigants by restoring twelve-person juries in civil cases and by 
prescribing early case control by the district court, including judicial 
control of party access to discovery. Judges—not the parties—should 
control access to discovery through a two-step process, with an initial 
hearing on whether to allow limited, preliminary discovery and later a 
second hearing to “peek” at the merits and decide whether there is a 
reasonable basis to grant access to full-fledged discovery. Further, 
courts should require parties to identify the necessary issues of fact 
and law and should permit only such discovery as is necessary to these 
issues, allowing the parties to supplement their list of issues as 
necessary at designated points in the litigation. 
Some may conclude that all is well with the district courts except 
for some excesses in discovery, or that the increased role of private 
dispute resolution is a welcome response to a movement away from 
the adversary state. I strongly urge against this conclusion. Some 
others may ask whether the modest changes in procedure and focus 
urged here respond strongly enough to the ongoing sea changes in the 
federal district courts. To those I respond that although there is a 
clear trajectory on which the courts are moving, the trajectory is such 
that a small turn may lead to a quite different destination. 
In many respects, the present trajectory summons images of civil 
law countries before the revolutions of the 1770s.36 Civil law litigation 
abjured live testimony. Judges did not see any witnesses; instead, they 
read written “testimony” prepared by other persons. There was no 
untidy association with the people. There was no event in the life of a 
 
 36. See generally Mauro Cappelletti & Bryan G. Garth, Introduction—Policies, Trends, and 
Ideas in Civil Procedure, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 5–6 
(Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1984). 
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case that brought all stakeholders or evidence together. Perhaps the 
most frightening image of all is that of paper over people and denial 
of resolution through delay and costs. Escape finally came with the 
oracular movement, riding the violent force of the French 
Revolution. This is not an image to which the United States should 
aspire. 
